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AB_TRA(_T
Wiring system failures have resulted from arc propagation in the
wiring harnesses of current aerospace vehicles. These failures
occur when the insulation becomes conductive upon the
initiation of an arc. In some cases, the conductive path of the
carbon arc track displays a high enough resistance such that the
current is limited, and therefore may be difficult to detect using
conventional circuit protection. Often, such wiring failures are
not simply the result of insulation failure, but are due to a
combination of wiring system factors. Inadequate circuit
protection, unforgiving system designs, and careless
maintenance procedures can contribute to a wiring system
failure. This paper approaches the problem with respect to the
overall wiring system, in order to determine what steps can be
taken to improve the reliability, maintainability, and safety of
space power systems. Power system technologies, system
designs, and maintenance procedures which have led to past
wiring system failures will be discussed. New technologies,
design processes, and management techniques which may lead to
improved wiring system safety will be introduced.
INTRODUCTION
The NASA Wiring for Space Applications program at NASA
Lewis Research Center was initiated in response to the
identification of arc-tracking as a possible result of improper use
of polyimide insulated wire. The goal of the NASA Office of
Safety and Mission Quality program is to determine the
information and guidance needed to improve the safety and
reliability of spacecraft wiring systems. In order to completely
address the issue of wiring safety, not only must new insulations
be developed, but the entire wiring system must also be
considered.
The arc-tracking problem with polyimide insulation was t-h-st
identified as an issue of concern in Navy aircraft [1]. A database
of significant testing information for the use of alternative
insulation constructions in aircraft was developed by the Air
Force [2]. There are, however, environmental conditions
typically experienced by NASA spacecraft, which the aircraft
programs did not need to address. An interim report outlining
the NASA operational environments was developed, and a
testing program was begun to examine new insulation
constructions in NASA spacecraft environmental conditions
such as atomic oxygen, ultraviolet radiation, high vacuum, and
thermal cycling [3,4].
The designing of wiring systems for spacecraft is a complex
process. Many factors including the operational environment,
electrical requirements, and the characteristics of the insulation
to be used must be considered. Unless a wiring insulation is
developed which will perform under all possible conditions,
which is very unlikely, the wiring system factors must also be
considered. Circuit protection technologies, design techniques,
and maintenance procedures which will lead to improved safety
should be identified.
In this paper, deficiencies in wiring system design, protection
technology, and maintenance procedures which have contributed
to wiring system failures in past NASA missions will be
reviewed. New technologies for circuit protection which may
reduce the risk of arc-tracking will be discussed. Future work
involving new techniques for system design including systems
engineering, concurrent engineering, and project management
methods, which may lead to a higher quality process from design
phase through operation and maintenance, will be introduced.
HISTORY OF SPA_ WIRING SYSTF2d FAILURES
In the history of NASA, there have been cases where failures in
the spacecraft wiring systems have led to the failure of
spacecraft components or even the entire mission. In most cases,
wiring system failures are not due to a single failure, but occur as
a result of multiple factors. These have included system designs
which expose wires to unacceptable conditions, circuit
protection technologies which didn't detect the fault, and
maintenance procedures which led to wiring damage [5,6,7].
While a testing program is being conducted to investigate new
insulation constructions and materials, the other contributors to
failure must also be addressed. Examples of NASA spacecraft
which have experienced wiring system failure, and the failure
mechanisms which occurred will be discussed in this section.
Failures Influenced By lnade0uate Technology
As previously stated, failures often have resulted from multiple
factors which when combined result in a wiring fault. For
example, under certain conditions the circuit protection devices
currently in use may be ineffective in interrupting an arc-
tracking fault. However, arc-tracking will not occur unless
previously degraded polyimide insulation is being used [5,6,7].
In the case of the STS-28 Teleprinter cable short, a short circuit
resulted due to polyimide insulation degradation (factor 1) which
was caused by a bad connector design (factor 2). The short was
not detected by the circuit breaker which was designed to protect
the orbiter wiring from a continuous fault current (factor 3),
because of the characteristics of the arc-tracking fault which
occurred [6,8]. If the peak currents which occurred during this
arc-tracking fault had been constant, their magnitude might have
been high enough to trip the circuit breaker, which was rated at
10 Amps, and had a trip characteristic as shown in Figure 1. The
total current of the arc-tracking fault, which is inconsistent as
shown in Figure 2, because of intermittent arcing across the gap
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Figure 1. Thermal Circuit Breaker Trip Characteristics [6] u.=
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between conductors, averaged 30 Amps with spikes up to 50 n,
amps [6]. Based on the total thermal energy in the circuit,
current would have to flow through the breaker at a 30 Amp ,e,
level for approximately 2.0 seconds to trip the circuit breaker, ,7,
while a 50 Amp current would trip the circuit breaker after 0.5
second [9]. The teleprinter cable short did not trip the circuit -*
breaker in this case because there was not enough thermal is,
energy generated by the arc-tracking fault before it eventually
extinguished itself [6].
In response to the ineffectiveness of this circuit breaker in
detecting this fault, a test program at Johnson Space Center
investigated the characteristics of the various circuit breakers,
fuses, and Remote Power Controllers (RPC's) used for the
shuttle program. The circuit protection limited the arc-lracking
propagation to lengths of less than 1" up to 6" [5,10,11]. Due to
the redundancy requirements of the space shuttle orbiters this
level of protection is acceptable [12]. However, applying new
technologies of fault detection to future spacecraft may improve
the system safety.
Failures Resulting From System Desima
There are also instances where the design of the wiring system
contributed to its own failure. Two such cases are the STS-28
Teleprinter Cable, and the Apollo 13 Oxygen Tank Wiring
System [6,13]. Although these failures have been corrected, it is
important to analyze the types of failure mechanisms which have
occurred in the past, to avoid similar failures in future systems.
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Figure 2. Fuel Cell Current During Arc-Tracking [6]
connectors which interface with the power supply panel were
changed to have a 90" strain relief as shown in Figure 3.
Additionally, the connectors were changed to a "clamp type" to
accommodate strain relief sheathing, and the insulation was
changed to Teflon to improve flexibility [5,6].
Apollo 13 Oxveen Tank
The wiring system design and a special "detanking" procedure
required to empty the Apollo 13 oxygen tank led to wiring
insulation degradation during ground testing. Failure of the
wiring during the mission caused the oxygen tank to explode and
threaten the lives of the three astronauts. Upon reviewing the
failure, the Apollo 13 review board concluded that while the
major features of the oxygen tank design were appropriate
(Figure 4), specific design features were susceptible to failure
[13]. The tanks contained potential ignition sources and
excessive amounts of combustible materials which were present
in the oxygen environment [13].
STS-28 Teleprinter Cable
Damage to the polyimide insulation of the
teleprinter cable was the result of the connector
which extended straight out from the power
panel requiring a sharp bend in the cable [6].
The repeated sharp bending of the wires over
the back edge of the connector strain relief led
to a circumferential break in the insulation [6].
The space shuttle program determined that
because the failure was not detectable through
pre-flight inspection or continuity and isolation
testing, the connector was inappropriate for this
application [6]. Therefore, changes were made
and incorporated in subsequent missions. The
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Figure 4. Oxygen Tank Wiring and Lines [13]
The design of the wiring for the oxygen tank fans was such that
"cold flow" of the insulation (Teflon) when pressed against
metal comers within the tank for an extended period of time,
could eventually result in the degradation of the insulation [13].
As shown in Figure 5, a shrink fit Teflon tubing was used to
encase the four 26 AWG wires which powered the fan motors
and ran from the motor housing to outside the heater fan tube.
This tubing provided protection for the wire bundle as it crossed
the sharp machined edges of the heater tube access hole.
However, the strain of the 90" bend of the wires at the motor
housing was not eased by such protection. In addition, when the
fan support tube was assembled, the wires may have been forced
against the support tube edges at point 'A' in Figure 5 [13].
Furthermore, during the assembly process, the insulation of the
electrical wiring inside the cryogenic storage tanks was exposed
to relatively sharp metal edges. Finally, while wiring the tank,
three bundles of six wires each were pulled sequentially through
the conduit in the oxygen tank dome (Figure 4). The board
found the size of this conduit was such that the last wires had to
be forcibly pulled through the conduit [13]. As a result, damage
to the wires in the conduit could have resulted which would not
be detected without physical inspections (which were not
possible with this design) [13]. Wiring system designs such as
these can lead to failures not detectable by normal testing [13].
Fully considering wiring system failure in the system design
process may improve the safety of wiring systems.
Figure 5. Typical wire routing for fan motor [13].
Failures Due to lmnrooer Maintenance Procedures
The space shuttle orbiters, due to their reusability, must be
serviced between each mission, and periodically major
modifications and maintenance are performed. As a result, the
condition of the wiring system is an important factor. The
process of maintaining and operating the space shuttle orbiters
has resulted in extreme mechanical stresses in areas where high
levels of maintenance traffic occurs.
In general, wire damage has been a concern with the Space
Shuttle Orbiters since the fast mission of OV-102 (Columbia) at
Kennedy Space Center in 1979 [6,14]. Major failures to the
space shuttle orbiters have been avoided due to the redundancy
and routing requirements, and the frequent wiring inspections
which have identified and repaired many hazardous conditions.
However, a failure related to mishandling of the wiring occurred
on the STS-6 flight, which resulted in insulation pyrolysis and
the melting of 6 conductors [15,16]. Failures also occurred on
Magellan and Spacelab while being serviced [16,17,18].
There have been many occurrences of wiring system damage on
the space shuttle orbiters, including an average of 1 short circuit
per turnaround period attributable to the maintenance processes
[19]. For example, between 1984 and 1985, there were 532
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Figure 6. Breakdown of Wiring System Problems [14]
cable and connector problems reported on the fleet of _or_
shuttle orbiters [19]. These problems included damage _,0 v_s_._,,_
to the electrical connectors, connector pins, backshells,
and wires. The distribution of these problem
occurrences are shown in Figure 6. In most cases, the Figure 7. Aft Fuselage External Tank Sidewall [5]
shuttle maintenance practices led to the problems, with
poor access, faulty connector design, and lightweight structural covers in the aft compartment were the Vertical
backshells also contributing to the failures [14]. Engine Support System (VESS), the Main Engine Heat Shield,
the Aft Fuselage Floor Area (OV-102 only), and the Aft
Various inspections of the space shuttle wiring revealed that in Sidewalls [5,6,14].
general, the condition of the orbiter wiring was good, except for
the areas with high levels of personnel traffic. In an effort to Inspections performed after the physical protection was added
reduce wiring damage, formal training programs on the proper revealed that the additional protection, rerouting, and elimination
methods for handling, installing, and protecting the wiring have of sharp edges was sufficient to stop further damage from
been developed for all the technicians, quality control inspectors, occurring. However, insulation degradation in high-traffic areas
and electrical power system engineers who come into contact
with the wiring systems [7,14,19,20]. It has been recommended continued to be a safety issue for the space shuttle orbiters
that the assembly and maintenance procedures be analyzed and [19,22]. There was still concern regarding cases of mlsrouting,
excessive tension on wires and connectors, improper installation,
improved where necessary to further reduce the potential for inadequate protection, and abuse during maintenance
wire damage [7,19]. procedures. To continually assure that the space shuttle orbiters
Due to the high levels of personnel traffic, wiring congestion, were safe, inspections were included as a part of the close-out
and damage history, additional wiring protection has been added process for all areas requiring maintenance during turnaround
to selected wire harnesses in the Environmental Control Life [7,19,20].
Support System (ECLSS) bay and the aft fuselage area of the NEW WIRING SYSTEM TECHNOLOGIES
orbiters. The protection was added in two phases, the t'h-Stphase
was completed before each shuttle returned to flight, the second
during major shuttle modification periods. The additional As shown previously in the case of the STS-28 teleprinter cable,
common circuit breakers and RPC's are based on continuous
protection was of two major types, sheet metal covers to protect
entire exposed areas, and convoluted tubing to shield smaller overload currents and could be ineffective in detecting arc-
areas [7,14]. tracking faults. Advanced circuit protection technologies may
improve the detection accuracy. Many techniques which may
Equipment bays in the orbiters (i.e. ECLSS bay) have large improve circuit protection for spacecraft wiring systems have
quantities of wire, which are installed in wire trays. The been identified [7], a number of these are discussed below.
equipment bays are also covered, further protecting the wires Solid State Power Controllers
from damage. Therefore, the damage in the ECLSS bay was not
extreme, and additional convoluted tubing was considered
sufficient [21]. However, the aft fuselage wiring is routed Circuit breakers which trip "instantly" upon the sensing of an
directly on the sidewalls, as no wire trays were used due to their overcurrent have been identified as a possible improvement in
additional weight [19]. As a result, the aft fuselage areas detecting arc-tracking. Solid State Power Controllers (SSPCs)
required major modifications due to insulation damage. The aft are currently available which provide an "instant trip" capability.
fuselage External Tank (ET)sidewall (Figure 7)required These devices have similar trip characteristics as
replacement harnesses with convoluted tubing, split convoluted electromechanical circuit breakers as shown in Figure 8, but can
tubing to existing wires, and structural covers to shield the trip within about 25 ps of sensing a current of sufficient
wiring from additional damage [5]. Other areas which required magnitude [23]. A possible problem with this method is that, in
general the overcurrent must be _> 1000% normal current rating
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Figure 8. SSPC Trip Characteristics [23].
to trip instantly, which may be too high to detect even the peaks
of the arc-tracking faults. Lowering this threshold may increase
the likelihood of false alarms.
D_l_l-Elemen¢ Tim¢-Delay Fuses
Another currently available device which may improve the
detection of faults is the dual-element fuse. A Dual-element
time-delay fuse provides protection against temporary overload
currents as well as sustained short-circuit currents. As shown in
Figure 9, a dual-element fuse has a normal non-time-delay fuse
to perform the short-circuit protection function, and an overload
element which provides protection against low-level
overcurrents or overloads. A typical dual element fuse will hold
an overload which is five times greater than the ampere rating of
the fuse for a minimum time of 10 seconds [24]. Further
analysis and testing needs to be performed to determine the
applicability of this device to space systems and arc-tracking.
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Figure 9. A Dual-Element Time-Delay Fuse [24].
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Figure 10. Zone Fault Detector Using Optical-Fiber Coil
Fiber Opdc Current Sensor
Another proposed concept for detecting fault currents, including
arc-tracking, in spacecraft wiring systems is to use a recently
developed fiber optic current sensor (FOCS). Applying the
FOCS in a differential current sensing mode could provide
highly sensitive protection against fault currents. The FOCS,
developed by the NASA Lewis Research Center and The
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provides
current sensing with immunity to Electromagnetic Interference
(EMI), a wide bandwidth, a low mass, and excellent isolation
[25,26]. The FOCS could detect faults through a zone-fault
detection scheme as shown in Figure 10, where the currents
entering and leaving the zone must be equal, or a fault is present.
To use such a method again requires additional investigation and
development.
"Intelligent" Fault Detection
For many years, in terrestrial and space power systems, methods
of detecting incipient and low current faults in electrical power
distribution systems have been investigated. Computer software
based fault detection algorithms which attempt to identify faults
via a "footprint" or "signature" of different failure modes offer
possibilities of improved circuit protection. Faults can be
detected for example, by identifying their unique energy
characteristics or the "arcing signatures" [27]. These
Autonomous Power System methods, and others, apply
knowledge based "expert" systems which have the ability to
"learn" and adapt to the unique characteristics of the system over
time. Similar concepts involving neural networks and fuzzy
logic control may also be applicable [28]. These concepts must
be further developed and investigated for applicability to space
power systems.
NEW SYSTEM DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT
Applying the methods of dynamic system engineering,
concurrent engineering and total quality management to the
design-manufacturing-maintenance processes of spacecraft
wiring systems may eliminate many of the factors which
contribute to wiring system failures. The entire process, from
beginning to end, must be addressed, because as can be seen in
existing cases of space shuttle payload manufacturing, despite
design specifications which indicate otherwise, wiring systems
are often installed using practices which are unacceptable [29].
To determine what, if any, improvements can be made, the
current methods of system design, manufacturing, and
maintenance need to be reviewed, and recent improvements
documented. This type of analysis will be performed as a part of
the NASA wiring program.
C..O.hT,I,.USID 
The NASA Wiring Program is an ongoing project to address the
reliability, maintainability, and safety of spacecraft wiring
systems. In addition to addressing the need for the development
of new wiring insulation constructions for NASA spacecraft, the
program is addressing the total system aspects of wiring safety.
Occurrences of problems with wiring systems illustrate the need
toconsidercircuitprotection,systemdesign,andmaintenance
proceduresinthediscussionf wiringsafety.
Improvedcircuitprotection including the use of instantaneous
trip circuit breakers, dual-element time-delay fuses, advanced
fiber optic current sensors, and "intelligent" fault diagnosis
methods may improve system safety by reducing or eliminating
the effects of incipient and low current faults such as arc-
tracking. These and other methods need to be addressed to
determine the impact of their use in spacecraft wiring systems.
To fully address the safety of a space power wiring system, the
entire life cycle of the spacecraft must be investigated. The
engineer's design methods, the contractor's manufacturing
processes, and the technician's maintenance techniques must all
take into account the issue of spacecraft wiring system safety.
Improvements in the wiring insulation combined with improved
wiring system considerations will result in more reliable,
maintainable, and safe spacecraft in future NASA missions.
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